We study the limiting behavior of competitive agents employing gradient-based learning algorithms through the lens of dynamical systems theory. Specifically, we introduce a general framework for competitive gradient-based learning that allows us to analyze a wide breadth of learning algorithms including policy gradient reinforcement learning, gradient based bandits, and certain online convex optimization algorithms. We show that for both potential games and general-sum games, when agents employ gradient-based learning algorithms, they will avoid a non-negligible subset of the local Nash equilibria. This is a strongly negative result for gradient-based learning in games. Our framework also sheds light on the issue of convergence to non-Nash strategies in general-sum and zero-sum games which have no relevance to the underlying game, and arise solely due to the choice of algorithm. The existence and frequency of strategies may explain some of the difficulties encountered when using gradient descent in zero-sum games (e.g. to train generative adversarial networks). Finally, we introduce a new class of games, Morse-Smale games, for which the gradient dynamics correspond to gradient-like flows. This class encompasses a large set of commonly encountered games. For Morse-Smale games, we show that competitive gradient-based learning converges to either limit cycles, Nash equilibria, or non-Nash fixed points almost surely. To reinforce our theoretical contributions, we provide empirical results that highlight the frequency of Nash equilibria that are almost surely avoided by policy gradient in linear quadratic games. Indeed, we present empirical results that show that policy gradient almost surely avoids the unique global Nash equilibrium in one out of five randomly sampled linear quadratic games.
Introduction
As machine learning algorithms are increasingly being deployed in real world settings, understanding how they interact, and the dynamics that can arise from their interactions is becoming crucial. In recent years, there has been a resurgence in research efforts on multi-agent learning, and learning in games. Indeed, game theoretic tools are even being used to robustify and improve the performance of machine learning algorithms (see, e.g., [21] ). Despite this activity, there is still a lack of understanding of the dynamics and limiting behaviors of machine learning algorithms in competitive settings and in games in particular.
Concurrently, there has been no shortage of papers on the convergence of gradient descent and its avoidance of saddle points (see, e.g., [17, 19, 28, 45] ). Due to their versatility and ease of implementation, gradient descent, and gradient-descent based algorithms are extremely popular in a variety of machine learning and algorithmic decision-making problems. The advantages of gradient-based methods have lead to them being widely adopted in multi-agent and adversarial learning problems [12, 15, 21, 24, 25, 34] . However, a thorough understanding of their convergence and limiting behaviors is still lacking.
Inspired by the recent works that focus on the single-agent case such as [30, 39] and long existing work in dynamical systems theory including convergence of stochastic approximation [3, 4, 7, 8] and urn processes [6, 40] , we investigate the convergence of competitive gradient-based learning to Nash equilibria and other limiting behaviors. Specifically, we are interested in settings where there are two or more competing agents, in potentially uncertain environments. Each agent optimizes their individual objective which depends on the decisions of all the other agents and possibly an external environmental signal. This scenario can be modeled most naturally as a game.
It is common in these settings to consider agents which adopt a learning algorithm for determining a strategy (policy) that governs their decisions. There are many different types of learning algorithms that have been proposed in the literature, several of which have their origins in the single agent-case. We consider the case where the agents adopt a gradient-based learning algorithm, one of the more common approaches in a number of different domains. In fact, in support of the latter point, we show that a wide variety of learning algorithms from different fields fit into the gradient learning framework we analyze.
We remark that there is a fundamental difference between the dynamics that are analyzed in much of the single-agent gradient-based learning and optimization literature and the ones we analyze in the competitive multi-agent case. As we show in the following sections, the combined dynamics of gradient-based learning schemes in games does not necessarily correspond to a gradient flow. This may seem a subtle point, but it it turns out to be extremely important. Gradient flows are a very narrow class of flows admitting nice convergence guarantees-e.g., almost sure convergence to local minimizers-due to the fact that they preclude flows with the worst geometries [41] . In particular, they do not exhibit non-equilibrium limiting behavior such as periodic orbits. Gradient-based learning in games, on the other hand, does not preclude such behavior. This makes the analysis more challenging.
Given the prominence of gradient-based learning schemes in multi-agent reinforcement learning, online optimization, and other machine learning contexts where game-theoretic ideas are being employed, it is important to understand and be able to interpret the limiting behavior of these coupled algorithms. Recent works have noted that limit cycles emerge in gradient-based learning algorithms. For instance, in [12] , it is demonstrated that limit cycles abound in gradient descent for training generative adversarial networks (GANs). Other very recent works have explored the existence of cycles in adversarial learning when the problem is considered in a game-theoretic context [35] , thereby highlighting the importance of understanding limiting behaviors other than equilibria of competitive learning algorithms. Dynamical systems exhibiting periodic orbits and other limiting behaviors, have long been studied and we borrow tools from dynamical systems theory in order to characterize the limiting behavior of competitive gradient-based learning.
Contributions
The high level contributions of this paper are two-fold. We first provide guarantees that competitive gradient-based learning algorithms (both when the agents have oracle access to their gradients and in the stochastic gradient setting) avoid linearly unstable critical points (i.e. strict saddle points) of the dynamics. This has positive implications for zero-sum games where such saddle points are generically not local Nash equilibria. For gradient-based learning in potential games and general-sum games, however, this is a strongly negative result. Indeed, this result implies that gradient-based learning algorithms will almost surely avoid a subset of the Nash equilibria of the game. This is a particularly interesting observation for potential games, which are ostensibly the nicest games one could hope to face when employing gradient-based learning as they admit a transformation of coordinates under which the agents can be viewed as optimizing a single objective function. Unlike single-agent gradient-descent, however, saddle points can be critical points of interest-i.e. Nash equilibria.
Secondly, by viewing gradient-based learning in games through the lens of dynamical systems theory, we highlight many of the problems plaguing such algorithms in practice. Specifically, we show that dynamics formed from the gradients of individual agent cost derivatives are not gradient flows and thus, competitive gradient-based learning may converge to periodic orbits. Further, we highlight the existence of non-Nash locally asymptotically stable equilibria of these dynamics. Such equilibria arise in both zero-sum and general-sum games and can be seen as artifacts of the choice of algorithm, and their relevance to the underlying game is unknown. Hence, some care needs to be taken regarding the implementation and the interpretation of the limit points of gradient-based learning algorithms in competitive settings. We provide examples in Appendix A demonstrating various limiting behaviors of gradient-based learning algorithms in competitive settings.
Concretely, the contributions of this paper are summarized as follows: • A characterization of the limiting behaviors of competitive gradient-based learning when all players either have access to their gradient, or to an unbiased estimate of their gradient. This is done by leveraging dynamical systems theory and the theory of stochastic approximations.
• A new class of games, namely Morse-Smale games, for which the dynamics correspond to a Morse-Smale vector field. There are a couple points to make here on the significance of this class of games and the results we have for them. First, it is well-known that Morse-Smale vector fields are generic [26, 38] -that is, almost all smooth vector fields are Morse-Smale. Morse-Smale vector fields (on compact manifolds) also have a finite number of critical points; hence, our results imply that almost all games on compact smooth manifolds admit gradient-like flows with a finite number of critical points (candidate Nash equilibria). Further linearly unstable cycles (which includes some Nash equilibria) are almost surely avoided under the gradient-like flow.
• A general framework for modeling competitive gradient-based learning that applies to a broad swath of learning algorithms. Gradient-based learning is a favored approach to multi-agent reinforcement learning, multi-armed bandits, adversarial learning, and multi-agent online learning and optimization. Such algorithms are increasingly being employed in these domains without a solid understanding of how to formally interpret the results. We provide a general framework for analyzing competitive gradient-based learning and a taxonomy of limiting behavior, that allows us to apply our theoretical results to commonly used learning algorithms.
• Illustrative examples highlighting the frequency of non-Nash critical points, and Nash equilibria that are saddle points of the gradient dynamics.
Organization
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce our framework for analyzing competitive gradient-based learning algorithms, as well as some mathematical and game theoretic preliminaries. In Section 3, we provide a brief taxonomy by drawing connections between the limiting behavior of gradient-based learning algorithms and game-theoretic and dynamical sys-tems notions of equilibria. In Section 4, we present our main theoretical results for competitive gradient-based learning in both the deterministic (where agents have oracle access to their gradients at each iteration) and stochastic (where agents have an unbiased estimator of their gradient at each iteration) settings. In the second case, we include a high-level overview of the categories of commonly used learning algorithms that fit into the framework we consider. We present empirical evidence that shows that gradient-play will avoid Nash equilibria in a potentially large subset of linear quadratic (LQ) games in Section 5. We conclude with discussion of the results and provide comments on future directions in Section 6. In Appendix A, we specialize our results to a number of very popular multi-agent learning algorithms and we provide several illustrative examples that highlight the different kinds of limiting behavior that gradient-based learning admits.
Preliminaries
Consider n agents, indexed by I = {1, . . . , n}. Each agent i ∈ I has their own decision variable x i ∈ X i , where X i is their finite-dimensional strategy space of dimension m i . Define X = X 1 × · · · × X n to be the finite-dimensional joint strategy space with dimension m = i∈I m i . Each agent is endowed with a cost function
where we use the notation x = (x i , x −i ) to make the dependence on the action of the agent x i , and the actions of all agents excluding agent i, x −i = (x 1 , . . . , x i−1 , x i+1 , . . . , x n ) explicit. Each agent seeks to minimize their own cost, but only has control over their own decision variable x i . In this competitive setting, agents' costs are not necessarily aligned with one another. Given the game (f 1 , . . . , f n ), our focus is on settings in which agents employ gradient-based learning algorithms in the search for an equilibrium. In particular, agents are assumed to update their strategies simultaneously according to a gradient based learning algorithm of the form
where agents either have oracle access to the gradient of their cost with respect to their own choice variable-i.e.
where D i f i denotes the derivative of f i with respect to x i -or they have an unbiased estimator for their gradient-i.e.
where {w i,t } is a zero mean, finite variance stochastic process. We refer to the former setting as deterministic gradient-based learning and we refer to the latter setting as stochastic gradient-based learning. Assuming that agents are employing an algorithm such as (1) , our goal is to analyze the stationary behavior of these coupled algorithms leveraging the following game-theoretic notion of a Nash equilibrium.
Definition 1 A strategy x ∈ X is a local Nash equilibrium for the game (f 1 , . . . , f n ) if for each i ∈ I there exists an open set W i ⊂ X i such that that x i ∈ W i and f i (x i , x −i ) ≤ f i (x i , x −i ) for all x i ∈ W i . If the above inequalities are strict, then we say x is a strict local Nash equilibrium. If W i = X i for each i, then x is a global Nash equilibrium.
Another important and useful characterization of Nash leverages first and second order conditions on player cost functions.
Definition 2 ( [42, 43])
A point x ∈ X is said to be a differential Nash equilibrium for the game
to be the vector of player derivatives of their own cost functions with respect to their own choice variables. A point x ∈ X is said to be a critical point for the game if ω(x) = 0. Note that ω(x) = 0 and D 2 ii f i (x) ≥ 0 are necessary conditions for a point x ∈ X to be a local Nash equilibrium [43] . Hence, all local Nash equilibria must be critical points.
Differential Nash need not be isolated, as the simple illustrative example in [42] shows. However, for a differential Nash x ∈ X, if
is non-degenerate-i.e. det(Dω(x)) = 0-then x is an isolated strict local Nash equilibrium.
Links Between Dynamical System and Game-Theoretic Notions of Equilibria
Before continuing, we remark that non-degenerate differential Nash equilibria are structurally stable [43] . Structural stability ensures that equilibria are stable and persist under small perturbations. We define stability of non-degenerate differential Nash equilibria as follows.
If agents initialize in a neighborhood of a stable differential Nash equilibrium x * and follow the flow defined byẋ = −ω(x), then they will asymptotically converge to x * . Specifically, if the spectrum of Dω(x * ) is strictly in the right-half plane, then the differential Nash equilibrium x * is locally (exponentially) attracting under the flow of ω [43, Proposition 2] . This, in turn, implies that a discretized version ofẋ = −ω(x), namely
converges locally for appropriately selected step size γ. Such results motivate the study of the continuous time dynamical systemẋ = −ω(x) in order to understand convergence properties of gradient-based learning algorithms of the form (1) . Along this line of thinking, let us draw a few more links between equilibria ofẋ = −ω(x) and characterizations of local Nash equilibria. To do so, we characterize the critical points of ω by their properties under the flow ofẋ = −ω(x).
Definition 4 A point x ∈ X is a locally asymptotically stable equilibrium of the continuous time dynamicsẋ = −ω(x) if ω(x) = 0 and Re(λ) > 0 for all λ ∈ spec(Dω(x)).
Let λ i (x) ∈ spec(Dω(x)) for i ∈ {1, . . . , m} denote the eigenvalues of Dω at x where Re(λ 1 (x)) ≤ · · · ≤ Re(λ m (x))-that is, λ 1 (x) is the eigenvalue with the smallest real part.
Definition 5 A point x ∈ X is a saddle point of the dynamicsẋ = −ω(x) if ω(x) = 0 and λ 1 (x) ∈ spec(Dω(x)) is such that Re(λ 1 (x)) ≤ 0.
A saddle point such that Re(λ i ) < 0 for i ∈ {1, . . . , n 1 } and Re(λ j ) > 0 for j ∈ {1, . . . , n 2 } with m = n 1 + n 2 and n 1 , n 2 = 0 is a strict saddle point or linearly unstable critical point-we use these terms interchangeably-of the continuous time dynamicsẋ = −ω(x).
We now present a few preliminary propositions that highlight the links between critical points under the flowẋ = −ω(x), and those critical points that have a particular game theoretic relevance.
Proposition 6 A non-degenerate differential Nash equilibrium is either a locally asymptotically stable equilibrium or a strict saddle point ofẋ = −ω(x).
Proof Suppose that x ∈ X is a non-degenerate differential Nash equilibrium. We claim that tr(Dω) > 0. Since x is a differential Nash equilibrium, D ii f i (x) > 0 for each i ∈ I; these are the diagonal blocks of Dω.
, tr(Dω(x)) > 0. Thus, it is not possible for all the eigenvalues to have negative real part. Since x is non-degenerate, det(Dω) = 0 so that none of the eigenvalues can have zero real part. Hence, at least one eigenvalue has strictly positive real part.
To finish, we show that the conditions for non-degenerate differential Nash equilibrium are not sufficient to guarantee that x is locally asymptotically stable for the gradient dynamics-that is, not all eigenvalues of Dω(x) have strictly positive real part. We do this by constructing a class of games with the strict saddle point property. Consider a class of two player games (f 1 , f 2 ) on R × R such that Dω(x) has the form
with a, b, c, d ∈ R. If x is a non-degenerate differential Nash equilibria, a, d > 0 and det(Dω(x)) = 0 which implies that ad = cb. Choosing c, d such that ad < cb will guarantee that one of the eigenvalues of Dω(x) is negative and the other is positive, making x a strict saddle points. This shows that non-degenerate differential Nash equilibria can be strict saddle points of the combined gradient dynamics. Hence, for any game (f 1 , . . . , f n ), a non-degenerate differential Nash equilibrium is either a locally asymptotically stable equilibrium or a strict saddle point, but it not strictly unstable or strictly marginally stable (i.e. having eigenvalues all on the imaginary axis).
Another important point to make is that not every locally asymptotically stable equilibrium ofẋ = −ω(x) is a non-degenerate differential Nash equilibrium. Indeed, the following example provides an entire class of games whose corresponding dynamicsẋ = −ω(x) admit locally asymptotically stable equilibrium that are not even local Nash equilibria.
Example 1 Consider the same class of games presented in proof of Proposition 6. That is, two player games (f 1 , f 2 ) on R × R with Dω(x) as in (4) . Suppose that x ∈ R 2 is a critical point such that a < 0, d > 0 or a > 0,d < 0-i.e. x is not Nash since it violates the necessary conditions for a local Nash equilibrium. Then as long as ad > cb, spec(Dω(x)) ⊂ C • − . Thus, the set of locally asymptotically stable equilibria that are not Nash equilibria may be arbitrarily large.
We now momentarily constrain ourselves to 2-player zero-sum games. Such games arise when training GANs, in adversarial learning, and in multi-agent reinforcement learning [22] [10] [37] .
Proposition 7
For an arbitrary two-player zero-sum game, (f, −f ) on R m , if x is a differential Nash equilibrium, then x is both a non-degenerate differential Nash equilibrium and a locally asymptotically stable equilibrium ofẋ = −ω(x).
Proof Consider a two player game (f (
For such a game, where the second line follows since D 2 11 f (x) > 0 and −D 2 22 f (x) > 0 for x, a differential Nash equilibrium. Since v is arbitrary, this implies that Dω(x) is positive definite and hence, clearly non-degenerate. Thus, for two-player zero-sum games, all differential Nash equilibria are both nondegenerate differential Nash equilibria and locally asymptotically stable equilibria ofẋ = −ω(x)
The preceding proposition shows that all non-degenerate differential Nash equilibria in twoplayer zero-sum games are locally asymptotically stable equilibria under the flow ofẋ = −ω(x). This has been shown before as a consequence of the results in [42] . However, we again remark that the converse is not true. Not every locally asymptotically stable equilibrium in two-player zero-sum games are non-degenerate differential Nash equilibria. Indeed, there may be many locally asymptotically stable equilibrium in a zero-sum game that are not local Nash equilibria. The following example highlights this fact.
Example 2 Consider a two player game (f (x 1 , x 2 ), −f (x 1 , x 2 )) with X i = R and Dω of the form
where a, b, c ∈ R. If a < c and b 2 > ac, then Dω(x) has eigenvalues strictly negative real part. Thus there exists a continuum of zero-sum games with a large set of locally asymptotically stable equilibria of the corresponding dynamicsẋ = −ω(x) that are not differential Nash.
We now briefly focus on a particularly nice set of games known as potential games [36] . These are games for which ω corresponds to a gradient flow under a coordinate transformation-that is, there exists a function φ such that for each i, D i f i (x) = D i φ(x) for all x. Note that a necessary and sufficient condition for (f 1 , . . . , f n ) to be a potential game is that Dω is symmetric [36] -that is,
This gives potential games the desirable property that the only locally asymptotically stable equilibria of the gradient dynamics in potential games are local Nash equilibria.
Proposition 8
For an arbitrary potential game, (f 1 , . . . , f n ) on R m , if x is a locally asymptotically stable equilibrium ofẋ = −ω(x) then x is a non-degenerate differential Nash equilibrium.
Proof The proof follows from the definition of a potential game. Since (f 1 , . . . , f n ) is a potential game, it admits a potential function φ such that D i f i (x) = D i φ(x) for all x. This, in turn, implies that at a locally asymptotically stable equilibrium ofẋ = −ω(x), Dω(x) = D 2 φ(x), where D 2 φ is the Hessian matrix of the function φ. Further D 2 φ(x) must have strictly positive eigenvalues for x to be a locally asymptotically stable equilibrium ofẋ = −ω(x). Since the Hessian matrix of a function must be symmetric, D 2 φ(x), must be positive definite, which through Sylvester's criterion ensures that each of the diagonal blocks of D 2 φ(x) is positive definite. Thus, we have that the existence of a potential function guarantees that the only locally asymptotically stable equilibria oḟ x = −ω(x), are differential Nash equilibria.
The preceding proposition rules out non-Nash locally asymptotically stable equilibria of the gradient dynamics in potential games. However, the following example shows that the existence of a potential function is not enough to rule out local Nash equilibria that are saddle points of the dynamics.
Example 3 Consider a two player potential game (f 1 (x 1 , x 2 ), f 2 (x 1 , x 2 )) with X i = R. At a differential Nash equilibrium, Dω has the form:
where a, b, c ∈ R, and a, c > 0. If b 2 > ac, Dω(x) has one positive eigenvalue and one negative eigenvalue. Thus there exists a continuum of potential games with a large set of differential Nash equilibria of the corresponding dynamicsẋ = −ω(x) that are strict saddle points.
We finish our mathematical preliminaries with a note on the relationship between non-degenerate differential Nash equilibria and local Nash equilibrium. It turns out that non-degenerate differential Nash equilibria are generic among local Nash equilibria. Hence, by proving statements about convergence to non-degenerate differential Nash equilibria, we are able to make statements about convergence to local Nash equilibria for almost all games in a formal mathematical sense. The following theorem first appeared in [44] for the two-player case, and while the extension to the n-player case is straightforward, we provide the proof in Section B for completeness.
Theorem 9 Non-degenerate differential Nash equilibria are generic among local Nash equilibria: for any smooth boundaryless manifolds
We provide the proof of this result in Appendix B.
Genericity implies that local Nash equilibria in an open-dense set of continuous games (in the C r topology on agent costs) are non-degenerate differential Nash equilibria. Thus, for almost all games, the set of local Nash equilibria coincides exactly with the set of non-degenerate differential Nash equilibria. This also implies that saddle points for the dynamics induced by the flow of ω(x) that are local Nash equilibria, are also generically strict saddle points.
For a game G = (f 1 , . . . , f n ), denote the set of strict saddle points and the set of locally asymptotically stable equilibria of the corresponding dynamics ω = (D 1 f 1 , . . . , D n f n ) as SSP(G) and LASE(G) respectively. Similarly, denote the set of local Nash equilibria, differential Nash equilibria, and non-degenerate differential Nash equilibria of G as LNE(G), DNE(G), and NDDNE(G), respectively. Combining the comments on genericity with the observations on stability gives us the following key takeaways:
• If G is a generic n-player general-sum game, then
• If G is a generic 2-player zero-sum game, then
• If G is a generic n-player potential game, then
The inclusions are strict due to the existence of non-Nash locally asymptotically stable equilibria in both the general-sum and zero-sum cases.
Main Theoretical Results
In this section, we provide the main theoretical results and differentiate those results from existing work. We also include a high-level overview of well-known algorithms that fit into class of learning algorithms we consider-and hence, to which our theory applies.
Deterministic Competitive Gradient-Based Learning
Let us first consider the deterministic setting in which agents have oracle access to their gradients at each time step. This setting encapsulates the case where agent know their own cost functions f i and observe their own actions as well as their competitors' actions-and hence, can compute the gradient of their cost with respect to their own choice variable-as well as the setting where agents do not necessarily know their cost or observe their competitors' actions, but rather some external oracle provides D i f i (x t,i , x t,−i ) to them at each iteration t.
Each agent i ∈ I has their own learning rate (i.e. step sizes γ i ) so that the joint dynamics of all the players are given by
where γ = (γ i ) i∈I and, by a slight abuse of notation, γ ω(x t ) is defined to be elementwise multiplication of γ and ω(·) where γ 1 is multiplied by the first m 1 components of ω, γ 2 is multiplied by the next m 2 components, and so on. We make the following assumptions on the cost functions f i and learning rates γ i .
Note that the norm · 2 is the induced 2-norm. We rewrite the game dynamics in the following form
where g : R m → R m : x → x − γ ω(x) and γ > 0 element-wise. Gradient-based optimization schemes always correspond to gradient flows whereas games are not afforded this luxury-indeed, Dω is not in general symmetric-and hence, this makes them a very interesting class of problems to study. In particular, the vector field defined by ω is not necessarily a vector field defined by the gradient of a function, and thus, the dynamicsẋ = −ω(x) admit limit cycles amongst their periodic orbits. This distinguishes gradient-based optimization from gradient-based learning in a multi-agent or game-theoretic setting. The following example is of a class of games admitting a variety of periodic orbits.
Example 4 Consider the game on
where agents are minimizers and α > 0 is a parameter. Then,
Transforming the dynamicsẋ = −ω(x) to radial coordinates,ṙ = αr(1 − r 2 ) andθ = 1, it is easy to see that there is a periodic orbit on a circle with unit radius for any α > 0. Moreover, the periodic orbit is a stable limit cycle for α > 0 and unstable limit cycle if α < 0. When α = 0, on the other hand, there are an infinite number of periodic orbits and no limit cycles. Moreover, when α < 0, (x 1 , x 2 ) = (0, 0) is a local, stable Nash equilibrium (and a locally stable critical point for the dynamics).
Having shown that gradient-based learning can exhibit limit cycles, the question remains: what are the limiting behaviors of gradient-based learning in competitive environments? The following result states that the set of initial conditions leading to linearly unstable equilibria is of measure zero.
Theorem 10 Let f i : X → R and γ satisfy Assumption 1. Suppose that X = X 1 × · · · × X n ⊆ R m is open and convex. If g(X) ⊂ X, the set of initial conditions x ∈ X so that competitive gradientbased learning converges to linearly unstable critical points (strict saddle points) is of measure zero.
First, we note that the above theorem holds for X = X 1 × · · · × X n = R m , in particular, since g(X) ⊂ X holds trivially in this case. It is also important to note that differential Nash equilibria can be linearly unstable critical points-that is, they can be strict saddle points of the dynamicsand due to Theorem 9, generically, so can local Nash equilibria. The above theorem says that all local Nash equilibria that are linearly unstable critical points for the discretization ofẋ = −ω(x) are avoided almost surely.
The proof of Theorem 10 relies on the stable manifold theorem [46, Theorem III.7] , [47] . We provide its statement in Theorem 25 in Appendix C. Some parts of the proof follow similar arguments to the proofs of results in [30, 39] which apply to (single-agent) gradient-based optimization. Due to the different learning rates employed by the agents and the introduction of the differential game form ω, the proof differs. Proof [of Theorem 10] We claim the mapping g : R m → R m is a diffeomorphism. If we can show that g is invertible and a local diffeomorphism, then the claim follows. Let us first prove that g is invertible.
Consider x = y and suppose
. If Dg is invertible, then the implicit function theorem [31, Theorem C.40] implies that g is a local diffeomorphism. Hence, it suffices to show that ΛDω(x) does not have an eigenvalue of 1. Indeed, letting ρ(A) be the spectral radius of a matrix A, we know in general that ρ(A) ≤ A for any square matrix A and induced operator norm · so that ρ(ΛDω(x)) ≤ ΛDω(x) 2 ≤ Λ 2 sup x∈R m Dω(x) 2 < max i |γ i |L < 1 Of course, the spectral radius is the maximum absolute value of the eigenvalues, so that the above implies that all eigenvalues of ΛDω(x)) have absolute value less than 1.
Since g is injective by the preceding argument, its inverse is well-defined and since g is a local diffeomorphism in R m , it follows that g −1 is smooth in R m . Thus, g is a diffeomorphism.
Consider all critical points to the game-i.e. X c = {x ∈ X| ω(x) = 0}. For each p ∈ X c , let B p be the open ball derived from Theorem 25 and let B = ∪ p B p . Since X ⊆ R m , Lindelõf's lemma [29] -every open cover has a countable subcover-gives a countable subcover of B. That is, for a countable set of critical points
Starting from some point x 0 ∈ X, if gradient-based learning converges to a strict saddle point, then there exists a t 0 and index i such that g t (x 0 ) ∈ B p i for all t ≥ t 0 . Again, applying Theorem 25 and using that g(X) ⊂ X-which we note is obviously true if X = R m -we get that
Using the fact that g is invertible, we can iteratively construct the sequence of sets defined by
contains all the intial points in X such that gradient-based learnign converges to a strict saddle.
Since p i is a strict saddle, I − ΓDω(p i ) has an eigevalue greater than 1. This implies that the co-dimension of E u is strictly less than m (i.e. dim(W cs loc ) < m). Hence, W cs loc ∩ X has Lebesgue measure zero in R m .
Using again that g is a diffeomorphism, g −1 ∈ C 1 so that it is locally Lipschitz and locally Lipschitz maps are null set preserving. Hence, W k (p i ) has measure zero for all k by induction so that X 0 is a measure zero set since it is a countable union of measure zero sets.
For the class of potential games, agents employing a gradient-based learning scheme converge to differential Nash equilibria almost surely.
and where each f i ∈ C r for r ≥ 3. Let ν be a prior measure with support X which is absolutely continuous with respect to the Lebesgue measure and assume lim t→∞ g t (x) exists. Then, under the assumption of Theorem 10, competitive gradient-based learning converges to non-degenerate differential Nash equilibria almost surely. Moreover, the non-degenerate differential Nash to which it converges is generically a local Nash equilibrium.
Proof Since the game admits a potential function φ,
so that analysis of the gradient-based learning scheme reduces to analyzing gradient-based optimization of φ. Moreover, existence of a potential function also implies that
Dω is symmetric. Indeed, writing ω(x) as the differential form
Symmetry of Dω implies that all periodic orbits are equilibria-i.e. the dynamics do not possess any limit cycles. By Theorem 10, the set of initial points that converge to linearly unstable critical points is of measure zero. Since all the stable critical points of the dynamics are equilibria, with the assumption that lim t→∞ g t (x) exists for all x ∈ X, we have that P ν lim t→∞ g t (x) = x * = 1 where x * is a non-degenerate differential Nash equilibrium which, by Theorem 9, is generically a local Nash equilibrium.
The interesting thing to point out here is that the agents do not need to be doing gradient-based learning on φ to converge to Nash almost surely. That is, they do not need to know the function φ; they simply need to follow the derivative of their own cost with respect to their own choice variable. The potential function φ is also generically a Morse function 1 and, as such, the number of critical points are finite. Thus, Corollary 11 implies that competitive gradient-based learning converges generically to one of finitely many local Nash equilibria in potential games.
Theorem 10 (and Corollary 11) is important since it suggests that gradient-play in multi-agent settings, avoids strict saddles almost surely even in the deterministic setting. For zero-sum games, this is a positive result since it suggests that eventually gradient-based learning algorithms will escape strict saddle points of the dynamics. For general-sum and potential games, as we noted in Section 2, strict saddle points can be local Nash equilibria. Therefore, this is a negative result since a potentially large subset of the local Nash equilibria in a game will be avoided almost surely under gradient-based learning.
Since games generally do not admit purely gradient flows, other types of limiting behavior such as limit cycles can occur in gradient-based learning dynamics. Theorem 10 says nothing about other limiting behavior. In the stochastic setting, we state stronger results on avoidance of linearly unstable periodic orbits which include limit cylces.
Stochastic Competitive Gradient-Based Learning
We now analyze the stochastic case in which agents are assumed to have an unbiased estimator for their gradient. The results in this section are significant as they allow us to extend the results from the deterministic setting to a setting where each agent builds an estimate of the gradient of their loss at the current set of strategies from potentially noisy observations of the environment. This setup allows us to analyze the limiting behavior of gradient-based learning schemes in multi-agent reinforcement learning, multi-armed bandits, generative adversarial networks, and online optimization. In particular, we extend our results from the previous section to show that with unbiased estimates of the gradient of their loss function with respect to their own choice variable, agents will almost surely not converge to linearly unstable critical points and cycles. We also construct a new class of games, namely Morse-Smale games, and show that for such games, using gradient-based learning algorithms, agents will converge to locally asymptotically stable equilibria, including, but not limited to, stable local Nash equilibria, or stable limit cycles. This second result implies that gradient-based learning algorithms can converge to non-Nash locally asymptotically stable equilibrium, which is again a negative result for gradient-based learning algorithms in games.
Each agent updates their strategy using
where h i is an unbiased estimator for D i f i and hence, we can write it as
for some zero-mean, finite-variance stochastic process {w i,t }. Before developing our theoretical results for stochastic case, let us comment on the different learning algorithms that fit into this framework.
EXAMPLE CLASSES OF GRADIENT-BASED LEARNING ALGORITHMS
The stochastic gradient-based learning setting we study is general enough to include a variety of commonly used multi-agent learning algorithms. The classes of algorithms we include is hardly an exhaustive list, and indeed many extensions and altogether different algorithms exist that can be considered members of this class.
In Table 1 , we provide the gradient-based update rule for six different example classes of learning problems: (i) gradient play in non-cooperative continuous games, (ii) GANs, (iii) multi-agent policy gradient, (iv) individual Q-learning, (v) multi-agent gradient bandits, and (vi) multi-agent experts. We provide a detailed analysis of these different algorithms including the derivation of the gradient-based update rules along with some interesting numerical examples in Appendix A. In each of these cases, one can view an agent employing the given algorithm as building an unbiased estimate of their gradient from their observation of the environment.
For example, in policy gradient (see, e.g., [48, Chapter 13] ), agents' costs are defined as functions of a parameter vector x i that parameterize their policies π i (x i ). The parameters x i are agent i's choice variable; through the learning scheme they aim to tune the parameter via following the gradient of their loss function in order to converge on an optimal policy π i . Perhaps surprisingly, it is not necessary for agent i to have access to π −i (x −i ) or even x −i in order for them to construct an unbiased estimate of the gradient of their loss with respect to their own choice variable x i as long as they observe the sequence of actions, say u −i,t , of all other agents generated. These actions are implicitly determined by the other agents' policies π −i (x −i )(·). Hence, in this case if agent i observes {(r j,t , u j,t , s j,t ), ∀ j ∈ I} where (r j , u j , s j ) are the reward, action, and state of agent j, then this is enough to construct an unbiased estimate of their gradient.
STOCHASTIC GRADIENT RESULTS
Coming back to the analysis of
we make the following assumptions.
Problem Class Gradient Learning Rule
Gradient Play Table 1 : Example problem classes that fit into competitive gradient-based learning rules. Details on the derivation of these update rules as gradient-based learning schemes is provided in Appendix A.
Assumption 2
The stochastic process {w i,t } satisfies the assumptions
where F i,t is an increasing family of σ ifields-filtration, or history generated by the sequence of random variables-given by
Assumption 3 For each i ∈ I, f i ∈ C r (X, R) with r ≥ 2, D i f i is Lipschitz for some constant 0 < L i < ∞, the step-sizes satisfy γ i,t ≡ γ t for all i ∈ I and t γ t = ∞ and t (γ t ) 2 < ∞, and sup t x t < ∞ a.s.
Let (a) + = max{a, 0} and a · b denotes the inner product.
Theorem 12
Consider a game (f 1 , . . . , f n ) on X = X 1 × · · · × X n = R m . Suppose each agent i ∈ I adopts a gradient-free learning algorithm that satisfies Assumptions 2 and 3. Further, suppose that for each i ∈ I, there exists a constant b i > 0 such that E[(w i,t · v) + |F i,t ] ≥ b i for every unit vector v ∈ R m i . Then competitive gradient-free learning converges to linearly unstable critical points of the game on a set of measure zero.
The above theorem implies that the stochastic approximation dynamics in (10), describing the competitive gradient-free learning corresponding to a game, avoid critical points of the game corresponding to strict saddles. The proof follows directly from showing under the assumptions that (10) satisfies Theorem 26.
We again point out that the set of linearly unstable critical points of the game includes a nonnegligible subset of the local Nash equilibria. Thus, the previous theorem says that stochastic gradient-based learning will avoid a non-negligible subset of the local Nash equilibria of the game almost surely. We note that the assumption E[(w i,t · v) + |F i,t ] ≥ b i , can be interpreted as a requirement on the noise having a nonzero component in each direction without which it is possible to converge to unstable points [40] .
Remark 13 Under the assumptions of Theorem 12, if (10) converges to a critical point, then that critical point is a locally asymptotically stable equilibrium of ω. In particular, not all points that are attracting under the flow ofẋ = −ω(x) are local Nash equilibria.
As we did with potential games in the preceding section, we can state stronger results for certain nice classes of games. As we have noted, games not admitting potential functions may lead to limit cycles. Hence, we use the expanded theory in [3, 6] to show that stochastic gradient-based learning algorithms avoid repelling sets.
To do so, we need further assumptions on our underlying space-i.e. we need the underlying decision spaces of agents to be smooth, compact manifolds without boundary where before we simply required them to either be Euclidean space-i.e. R m -or some open, convex subset of R m satisfying g(X) ⊂ X. In particular, let X i be a smooth, compact manifold without boundary for each i ∈ I. The stochastic process {x n } which follows (10) is defined on X-that is, x n ∈ X for all n ≥ 0. As before, it is natural to compare sample points {x n } to solutions ofẋ = −ω(x) where we think of (10) as a noisy approximation. As in the previous section, the asymptotic behavior of {x n } can indeed be described by the asymptotic behavior of the flow generated by ω.
A non-stationary periodic orbit of ω is called a cycle. Let ξ ⊂ X be a cycle of period T > 0. Denote by Φ T the flow corresponding to ω. For any x ∈ ξ, spec(DΦ T (x)) = {1} ∪ C(ξ) where C(ξ) is the set of characteristic multipliers. We say ξ is hyperbolic if no element of C(ξ) is on the complex unit circle. Further, if C(ξ) is strictly inside the unit circle, ξ is called linearly stable and, on the other hand, if C(ξ) has at least one element on the outside of the unit circle-that is, DΦ T (x) for x ∈ ξ has an eigenvalue with real part strictly greater than 1-then ξ is called linearly unstable. The latter is the analog of linearly unstable critical points in the context of periodic orbits.
We denote by {x t } sample paths of the process (10) and L({x t }) is the limit set of any sequence {x t } t≥0 which is defined in the usual way as all p ∈ R m such that lim k→∞ x t k = p for some sequence t k → ∞. It was shown in [3] that under less restrictive assumptions than Assumptions 2 and 3, L({x t }) is contained in the chain recurrent set of ω and L({x t }) is a non-empty, compact and connected set invariant under the flow of ω.
Theorem 14
Consider a game (f 1 , . . . , f n ) where each X i is a smooth, compact manifold without boundary. Suppose each agent i ∈ I adopts a stochastic gradient-based learning algorithm that satisfies Assumptions 2 and 3 and is such that sample points x t ∈ X for all t ≥ 0. Further, suppose that for each i ∈ I, there exist a constant b i > 0 such that E[(w i,t · v) + |F i,t ] ≥ b i for every unit vector v ∈ R m i . Then competitive gradient-free learning converges to linearly unstable cycles on a set of measure zero-i.e. P (L(x t ) = ξ) = 0 where {x t } is a sample path.
As we noted, periodic orbits are not necessarily excluded from the limiting behavior of gradientbased learning in games. We leave out the proof of Theorem 14 since, other than some algebraic manipulation, it is a direct application of [6, Theorem 2.1] (which we provide in Theorem 27 in Appendix C).
The above theorem simply states competitive stochastic gradient-based learning avoids linearly unstable cycles on a set of measure zero. Of course, we can state stronger results for a more restrictive class of games admitting gradient-like vector fields. Specifically, analogous to [6] , we can consider Morse-Smale vector fields. We introduce a new class of games, which we call MorseSmale games, that are a generalization of potential games. These are a very important class of games as they correspond to Morse-Smale vector fields which are known to be generic and in the case that the joint strategy space is a compact manifold, this implies Morse-Smale games are open, dense in the set of games.
Definition 15 A game (f 1 , . . . , f n ) with f i ∈ C r for some r ≥ 3 and where strategy spaces X i is a smooth, compact manifold without boundary for each i ∈ I is a Morse-Smale game if the vector field corresponding to the differential ω is Morse-Smale-that is, the following hold: (i) all periodic orbits ξ (i.e. equilibria and cycles) are hyperbolic and W s (ξ) W u (ξ) (i.e. the stable and unstable manifolds of ξ intersect transversally), (ii) every forward and backward omega limit set is a periodic orbit, (iii) and ω has a global attractor.
The conditions of
Morse-Smale in the above definition ensure that there are only finitely many periodic orbits. The simplest example of a Morse-Smale vector field is a gradient flow. However, not all Morse-Smale vector fields are gradient flows and hence, not all Morse-Smale games are potential games. Example 5 Consider the n-player game with X i = R for each i ∈ I and f n (x) = x n (x 2 1 − 1), f i (x) = x i x i+1 , ∀i ∈ I/{n} This is a Morse-Smale game that is not a potential game. Indeed, x = −ω(x) where ω = [x 2 , x 3 , . . . , x n−1 , x 2 1 − 1] is a dynamical system with a Morse-Smale vector field that is not a gradient vector field [11]. Essentially, in a neighborhood of a critical point for a Morse-Smale game, the game behavior can be described by a Morse function f such that near critical points ω can be written as Df and away from critical points ω points in the same direction as Df -i.e. ω · Df > 0. Specializing the class of Morse-Smale games, we have stronger convergence guarantees.
Theorem 16
Consider a Morse-Smale game (f 1 , . . . , f n ) on smooth boundaryless compact manifold X. Suppose Assumptions 2 and 3 hold and that {x t } is defined on X. Let {ξ i , i = 1, . . . , l} denote the set of periodic orbits in X. Then
implies ξ i is linearly stable. Moreover, if the periodic orbit ξ i with P (L({x t }) = ξ i ) > 0 is an equilibrium, then it is either a non-degenerate differential Nash equilibrium-which is generically a local Nash-or a non-Nash locally asymptotically stable equilibrium.
The proof of Theorem 16 utilizes [6, Corollary 2.2] (which we provide in Corollary 28 in Appendix C).
If we further restrict the class of games to potential games, the above theorem implies convergence to Nash in almost surely.
Corollary 17
Consider the game (f 1 , . . . , f n ) on smooth boundaryless compact manifold X admitting potential function φ. Under the assumptions of Theorem 14, competitive stochastic gradientbased learning converges to a non-degenerate differential Nash equilibrium almost surely. Moreover, the differential Nash to which it converges is generically a local Nash equilibrium.
Proof [Corollary 17] Consider a potential game (f 1 , . . . , f n ) where each X i is a smooth, compact boundaryless manifold. Then ω = Dφ for some φ ∈ C r which implies that ω is a gradient flow and hence, does not admit limit cycles. Let {ξ i , i = 1, . . . , l} be the set of equilibrium points in X. Under the assumptions of Theorem 16,
then ξ i is a linearly stable equilibrium point which is a non-degenerate differential Nash equilibrium of the game due to the fact that Dω(x) is symmetric since the game is a potential game. Hence, a sample path {x t } converges to a non-degenerate differential Nash equilibrium with probability one. Moreover, by Theorem 9, we know it is generically a local Nash.
This result holds because potential games correspond exactly to gradient flows which do not admit periodic cycles that are not equilibria as we showed in the proof of Corollary 11. However, potential games can admit local Nash equilibria that are strict saddle points as we showed in Example 3.
Saddle Point Local Nash Equilibria in Linear Quadratic Dynamic Games
We now present empirical results that show that a non-negligible subset of two-player LQ games have local Nash equilibria that are strict saddle points of the gradient dynamics. LQ games serve as good benchmarks for analyzing the limiting behavior of gradient play since they are known to admit unique global Nash equilibria that can be found be solving a coupled set of Riccati equations. Further, gradient-play in this setting is analogous to a multi-agent reinforcement learning setting where policy gradient is used and the policy is assumed to be a linear function of the state. Thus, the empirical results we present imply that, even in the relatively straightforward case of linear dynamics, linear feedback policies, and quadratic costs, policy gradient multi-agent reinforcement learning avoids local Nash equilibria in a non-negligible subset of problems.
For the setup we consider, we find that up to 20% of randomly sampled LQ games have a strict saddle point of the dynamics as their unique global Nash equilibria. This implies that policy gradient on such problems would fail to converge to Nash in 1 in 5 LQ games having this structure. This in turn supports the idea that for more complicated cost functions, policy classes, and dynamics, local Nash equilibria that are strict saddle points of the policy gradient dynamics must be common. For simplicity, we consider two-player LQR games in R 2 . Consider a discrete time dynamical system defined by:
where z(t) ∈ R 2 is the state at time t, and u 1 and u 2 are the control inputs of players 1 and 2, respectively. We assume that each player i is searching for a linear feedback policy of the form, u i (t) = −K i z(t), that minimizes their loss which is given by
where Q i > 0 and R i > 0 are the cost matrices on the state and input respectively of player i. We note that the two players are coupled through the dynamics since z(t) is constrained to obey the update equation (11) . A closed form for ω in this setting is given by
where we compute P 1 and P 2 by solving the Riccati equations for a given K 1 and K 2 which are given by
Our experiments proceed as follows. We fix B 1 , B 2 and the cost matrices Q i , R i for i = 1, 2. Then, at each round we:
1. Randomly generate the dynamics matrix A. 2. Find the optimal feedback matrices K * 1 , K * 2 using the method of Lyapunov iterations described in Appendix D. 3. Numerically approximate Dω evaluated at K * 1 , K * 2 using auto-differentiation tools and check its eigenvalues. In Figure 1 , we show the empirical frequency of randomly generated LQ games where the unique global Nash equilibrium is a strict saddle point of the gradient dynamics.
Discussion and Future Directions
We conclude with a brief discussion of the implications of our results on the convergence of gradientbased learning algorithms in competitive settings which abound in the multi-agent learning literature.
We provide a general framework for competitive gradient-based learning that encompasses a number of commonly used methods in multi-agent learning including policy gradient in multi-agent reinforcement learning, gradient-based and Exp3 multi-agent multi-armed bandits, gradient-based schemes for GANs, and gradient-based learning in multi-agent online optimization.
We first show that, in a deterministic setting, linearly unstable critical points are avoided almost surely which has positive and negative implications depending on the game structure. Namely, for general sum games and potential games, where we showed in Section 3 that local Nash equilibria can be strict saddle points of the gradient dynamics, our results suggest that a subset of the local Nash equilibria are almost surely avoided by gradient-play. Further, we showed that for both zerosum and general-sum games, the set of locally asymptotically stable equilibria of the dynamics is not made up solely of Nash equilibria. Thus, gradient play in both settings can converge to nonNash critical points whose relevance to the game is unknown. Finally, we highlight the fact that unlike the single agent case, multi-agent gradient based learning admits periodic orbits that are not simple equilibria-i.e. limit cycles.
The stochastic case allows us to consider the setting where each agent builds an estimate of the gradient of their loss from noisy samples of the environment which, in turn, allows us to extend our results from the deterministic setting and draw conclusions about the limiting behavior of gradientbased learning schemes in multi-agent reinforcement learning, multi-armed bandits, GANs, and online optimization. Combined, our results in this setting suggest that gradient-play in multi-agent settings has fundamental problems. Even if the algorithms do converge, they may have converged to a point that has no game theoretic relevance, namely a non-Nash locally asymptotically stable equilibrium. This result holds when gradient based algorithms are used in zero-sum games, including when stochastic gradient descent is used to train GANs, and may explain some of the difficulties that arise when training GANs. The training procedure is working correctly, but converging to an undesired result. Lastly, these results show that limit cycles persist even under a stochastic update scheme. This explains the empirical results shown in Appendix A and in the literature [12, 27, 32] . It also implies that gradient-based learning in multi-agent reinforcement learning, multi-armed bandits, generative adversarial networks, and online optimization all admit limit cyles under certain loss functions.
This work makes no claims on the existence of Nash equilibria in games, or even on the rate of convergence to limiting behaviors, which are themselves very interesting areas of research. One direction of future research is in developing a better understanding of the geometry of the individual agent strategy spaces, the joint strategy space, and the graphs of the agents' loss functions. This would, in turn, lead to a better sense of the difficultly of escaping saddle points of the dynamics, and in the case of zero-sum games, the likelihood of converging to a Nash equilibrium. For instance, it may be possible to extend recent works exploring the rate of escape from saddle points [13, 28] and saddle point geometry to the multi-agent setting. Since multi-agent settings admit not only equilibria as critical points, but also limit cycles, there are a number of open questions around the characterization of non-equilibrium limiting behavior: How do we interpret limit cycles? Are they samples from a mixed policy? Does their time-averaged behavior correspond to a Nash equilibrium or an equilibrium in another sense? Another interesting open question is whether certain classes of gradient-based learning algorithms avoid certain dynamics altogether.
We finish by noting that it is extremely important to understand the limiting behaviors of multiagent learning. If one does not know a priori what the game can converge to, or what the dynamics of the game can look like, undesirable behaviors could arise, such as unwanted collusion between agents, high social costs, or cycling. This implies that the setup of the game itself, as well as the algorithms chosen by the players, has to be done with the potential limiting behavior taken into consideration. Indeed, as learning algorithms are increasingly deployed in markets and other competitive environments, their implementation and the interpretation of their dynamics will become increasingly important.
Appendix A. Application to Classes of Gradient-Based Learning Algorithms
In this section, we provide derivation of the gradient-based learning rules provided in Table 1 as well as some very interesting and illustrative numerical results from their implementation.
A.1. Online Optimization: Gradient Play in Non-Cooperative Games
The third class of algorithms that fits under the general notion of gradient-based multi-agent learning algorithms are classical online optimization algorithms. In this case, each agent is directly trying to minimize their own function f i (x i , x −i ), which can depend on the current iterate of the other agents. There are many examples in the optimization literature of this type of setup. We note that in the full information case, the competitive gradient-based learning framework we describe here is simply gradient play [16] , a very well-studied game-theoretic learning rule. Here we provide an illustrative example of a game that give rise to interesting limiting behavior. Consider the two player game outlined in Example 4, where we assume players are minimizing the following costs:
For α > 0, these dynamics have a stable limit cycle and for α < 0, there is an unstable limit cylce on the unit circle. Moreover, when α < 0, (x 1 , x 2 ) = (0, 0) is a locally stable critical point of the dynamics and a local Nash equilibrium; indeed, the eigenvalues of −Dω(0, 0) are in the open right-half plane which shows it is stable and
which shows it is Nash. In the full information case, the vector field ω associated with this game only has one stable limit cycle, and an unstable equilibrium at x 1 = x 2 = 0. Thus, random initializations will converge to this limit cycle almost surely. This behavior is shown empirically in Figure ? ?. The above example demonstrates interesting limiting behavior of gradient play in the full information case. Perhaps more relevant to the learning community is the gradient-free case. That is, if the agents can query their own function, but perhaps not its gradient, one solution to the online optimization problem is suggested by [14] . The game can be described as follows. At each iteration, t of the game, every player publishes their current iterate x i,t . Player i, implementing this algorithm, then updates their iterate by taking a random unit vector u, and querying f i (x i + δ i u, x −i ). The update map is given by x i,t+1 = x i,t − γ i f i (x i + δ i u, x −i )u. It is shown in [14] that f i (x i + δ i u, x −i )u is an unbiased estimate of the gradient of a smoothed version of f i -i.e.
Thus the loss function being minimized by the agent isf i . In this case, the results on characterizing limiting behavior presented in Section 4.2 apply.
A.2. Generative Adversarial Networks
Generative adversarial networks take a game theoretic approach to fitting a generative model in complex structured spaces. Specifically, they approach the problem of fitting a generative model from a data set of samples from some distribution Q ∈ ∆(Y ) as a zero-sum game between a generator and a discriminator. In general, both the generator and the discriminator are modeled as deep neural networks. The generator network outputs a sample G θ (z) ∈ Y in the same space Y as the sampled data set given a random noise signal z ∼ F as an input. The discriminator D w (y) tries to discriminate between a true sample and a sample generated by the generator-that is, it takes as input a sample y drawn from Q or the generator and tries to determine if its real or fake. The generator, of course, wants to trick the discriminator.
This process can be modeled efficiently as a zero-sum game between the generator and discriminator. The goal, then, is to find a Nash equilibrium of the zero-sum game under which the generator will learn to generate samples that are indistinguishable from the true samples-i.e. in equilibrium, the generator has learned the underlying distribution. In zero-sum games, the Nash equilibria very often correspond to saddle points.
GANs are notoriously difficult to train. They typical approach is to allow each player to perform (stochastic) gradient descent on the derivative of their cost with respect to their own choice variable. There are two important observations about gradient-based learning approaches to GANs relevant to this paper. First, the equilibrium that is sought is generally a saddle point and second, the dynamics of GANs are complex enough to admit limit cycles. Indeed, in a very recent work, it was shown that no variant of gradient descent that falls in the large class of Follow-the-Regularized-Leader algorithms can converge to an equilibrium in terms of the last-iterate and, moreover, such approaches are bound to converge to limit cycles around the equilibrium [35] . Yet, none-the-less, this approach is still very common. In [12] , they further demonstrate that most common modifications to gradient descent such as clipping or adding a momentum term still converge to a limit cycle independent of the choice of step-size.
Proposition 18
Gradient-based learning approaches for training GANs converge to local Nash equilibria with the strict saddle point property on a set of measure zero.
A.3. Wasserstein GANs
To prevent instabilities in the training of GANs with zero-one discriminators, the Wasserstein GAN attempts to approximate the Wasserstein-1 metric between the true distribution and the distribution of the generator. In this problem, D w (·) is a 1-Lipschitz function leading to the game
the corresponding gradient-based dynamics are given by
where γ is the learning rate. Initializations (circles) converge to a limit cycle and this limit cycle is centered on the Nash equilibrium. The set of initializations that converge to the Nash equilibrium is thus measure zero.
However, due to the fact that the discriminator is approximating a Lipschitz function, when training the discriminator, the function D w (·) needs to have a bounded gradient. One approach to this problem of ensuring a bounded gradient is to introduce a penalty to the loss function of the zero-sum game. In [23] , they add the 2 -norm of the gradient of D w (x) so that the loss becomes
where Q is the distribution of the random vector x + (1 − )G θ (z) when x ∼ Q and z ∼ N (0, I). Let us consider a simple example which is highly illustrative of the potential pitfalls of naïve gradient-based learning in multi-agent learning. Specifically, consider the Wasserstein GAN which is based on the premise that the discriminator is approximating all 1-Lipschitz functions of the data meaning that the discriminator has a bounded gradient. Here we consider a simple example where the data are generated by a multi-variate normal distribution Q = N (µ, I) with µ ∈ R m . Let the generator, which wants to learn µ, be an additive displacement of some input noise z ∼ N (0, I)-i.e. G θ (z) = z + θ-and let the discriminator be a linear function-i.e. D w (x) = w, x . The gradient-based dynamics for this WGAN are given by
In Figure 3 , we show both phase plots and plots of the trajectories during the learning process for the WGAN described above with λ = 0.2, γ = 0.1 and using v = [1, 2] . This zero-sum game has a Nash equilibrium at (w * , θ * ) = (0, 0, 1, 2). This point is an unstable critical point for the dynamics for any λ = 0. Moreover, as λ → 0, this Nash equilibrium becomes a saddle point. The discrete dynamics (i.e. gradient update ) in this case, however, are unstable for any choice of step size γ. A commonly used approach in GANs is to employ clipping-that is, clip w t and θ t at some maximum threshold. Employing this technique results in the gradient-based learning rule converging again to a limit cycle, however, it is oscillating around the saddle point equilibrium. An example of this can be seen in the right-most plot in Figure 3 .
A.4. Multi-Agent Reinforcement Learning Algorithms
In this subsection, we show how policy gradient applied in multi-agent settings and a more recent algorithm introduced in [49] that is tailored to competitive settings, are gradient-based multi-agent learning algorithms. We state our general setup for MARL and derive the loss and the estimator of the gradient of the loss for a given agent i ∈ I in both cases.
In our formulation for MARL, agents are all operating in a MDP. There is a shared state space S. Each agent, indexed by I = {1, . . . , n} has their own action space U i and reward function
We note the reward functions could themselves be random, but for illustrative purposes we suppose they are deterministic. Finally, the dynamics of the MDP are described by a state transition kernel P : S × U → ∆ S and an initial state distribution P 0 . Each agent i also has a policy, π i , that returns a distribution over U i for each state s ∈ S.
Before defining the objective and learning method of each player, we begin by defining a trajectory of the MDP, τ as τ = {(s t , u i,t , u −i,u )} T −1 t=0 . Thus, a trajectory is a finite sequence of states, the actions of each player in that state, and the reward agent i received in that state, where T is the time horizon. Given fixed policies we can define a distribution over the space of all trajectories Γ, namely P Γ (π), by
The goal of each single agent in this setup is to maximize their cumulative expected reward over a time horizon T . That is, the agent is trying to find a policy π i so as to maximize some function, which in keeping with our general formulation in Section 2, we write as −f i since this problem is a maximization.
A.4.1. MULTI-AGENT POLICY GRADIENT
Let use first consider classical policy gradient [48] . When an agent is employing policy gradient in this MARL setup, we assume that their policy comes from a parametric class of policies parametrized by x i ∈ X i ⊂ R m i . To simplify notation, we write the parametric policy as π i (x i ) where for each x i , given an state s, π i (x i ) is a probability distribution on actions u i which we denote by π i (x i )(·|s).
Proposition 19
Policy gradient for multi-agent reinforcement learning is a competitive gradientbased learning algorithm. In the full information case, under the assumptions of Theorem 10, policy gradient converges to strict saddle points on a set of measure zero. In the gradient-free case, under the assumptions of Theorem 12 (respectively, Theorem 14), policy gradient converges to strict saddles (respectively, linearly unstable cycles) on a set of measure zero.
Proof The proof simply requires us to reformulate policy gradient in the competitive gradient-based learning framework.
An agent i using policy gradient is trying to tune the parameters x i of their policy to maximize their expected reward over a trajectory of length T . We define the reward of agent i over a trajectory of the MDP, τ ∈ Γ, to be R i (τ ) = T −1 t=0 R i (s t , i,t , u −i,t ). Thus, each agent's loss function f i , in keeping with our notation, is given by
The actions of agent i in the continuous game framework described in previous sections are the parameters of their policy, and thus their action space is X i ⊂ R m i . We note that we have made no assumptions on the other player's actions x −i . That is, they do not need to be employing the same parameterized policy class or exactly the same gradient-based update procedure; the only requirement is that they also be using a gradient based multi-agent learning algorithm, and that their actions give rise to a set of policies π −i that govern the way they choose their actions in the MDP.
In the full information case, at each round, t of the game, a player plays according to π i (x i,t ) for a time horizon T , and then performs a gradient update on their parameters where
Indeed, Recall that the function being maximized is given by
where
. Assuming the expectation in 13 is finite, and certain other standard regularity assumptions from reinforcement learning, we can differentiate under the integral. The following is a standard derivation of the policy gradient:
The first step uses the fact that D x P Γ (τ ; π) = D x log(P Γ (τ ; π))P Γ (τ ; π). The second uses the fact that the dynamics of the MDP and the policies of all the other agents are assumed to be independent and do not depend on x. By expanding R i (τ ), using the fact that E u i ∼π i [D x log π i (x)(u i |s)] = 0, and rearranges terms, we get the expression in (13) 
On the other hand, in the partial information case, at each time t in the policy gradient update procedure, agent i receives a T horizon roll-out, say z i,t = {(s k , u i,k , r i,k )} T −1 k=0 , and constructs the unbiased estimate of the gradient-i.e.
We note that in this case, the agent does not need to know the policies of the other agents, or anything about the dynamics of the MDP. The agent can construct the estimator solely from the sequence of states, the reward they received in those states, and their own actions.
With these two derivations of the gradient for the full information and gradient-free cases, policy gradient for MARL conforms to the competitive gradient-based learning framework and hence, the results of Section 4 apply under appropriate assumptions.
A.4.2. MULTI-AGENT LEARNING WITH POLICY PREDICTION
Let us now consider a slight generalization of policy gradient-i.e. multi-agent learning with policy prediction (MAL-PP) introduced in [49] . We use this example to highlight how the gradient based framework extends to more intricate cost functions. We note that this approach was developed for two-player, two-action matrix games, and thus I = {1, 2}. The loss function for player 1 is given by
where the time horizon T = 1. This can be seen as explicitly taking into account the fact that the other player is doing learning of their own. The gradient is calculated explicitly for 2-player, 2-action matrix games in [49] in the full information case. This framework, however, requires full information over the other players policy, parameters of their policy, and step size. None-the-less, the full information results derived in Section 4, apply.
A.5. Multi-Armed Bandits: Individual Q-learning, Gradient Bandits, and Experts
The multi-armed bandit (MAB) literature, also has many algorithms that fit into this gradient-based learning framework. We show that individual Q-learning, gradient bandits, and Exp3 (see [48] ) can both be seen as gradient-based learning algorithms.
A.5.1. INDIVIDUAL Q-LEARNING
One of the most basic reinforcement learning schemes for single-agent decision-making is given by
where u t is the action at time t and R t is the reward [48] . There have been many efforts to extend this to a multi-agent setting both in the game-theoretic and computer science fields. The scenario we consider, which was first introduced by [16] , is such that there are n players faced with a choosing from a finite set of actions U i with |U i | = m i repeatedly in time and their goal is to maximize their reward which is a function of all the players actions, i.e., R i (u i , u −i ). Each agent employs the following update (see [32] ):
where π i is agent i's strategy and {γ t } t≥1 is a deterministic sequence of learning parameters satisfying t≥1 γ t = ∞ and t≥1 (γ t ) 2 < ∞.
It is fairly easy to see that the above update can be written as player i performing gradient ascent on the reward
and the derivation follows a very similar procedure as in the previous subsection on gradient-based multi-armed bandit algorithms. We leave this to the reader and instead examine the corresponding continuous differential equation which has been shown to have exactly the same critical point set as the individual Q-learning rule. Indeed, it was shown in [5] that the values Q t = (Q 1,t , . . . , Q n,t ) that result from the individual Q-learning algorithm converge almost surely to a connected internally chain-recurrent set of the flow defined by the dynamics
assuming the Q t are bounded for all t and where r i (u i , π −i (q t )) is the expected reward that agent i receives if they play action u i and all other agents have policy π −i . It is also show that the trajectories of (15), the Q-learning dynamics, correspond to trajectories of the smoothed-best response dynamics
where b i (·) is the smoothed best response map-e.g., it may be the Boltzmann distribution
Note that with the Boltzmann distribution as the smoothed best response map, for two-player matrix games, the dynamics in (16) correspond exactly to the logit dynamics [16, 27] . To illustrate the kinds of behaviors individual Q-learning leads to, we consider a class of matrix games known as Rock-Paper-Scissors or Ro-Sham-Bo. The two-player game is a zero-sum game where the general form of the payoff matrix is given by
In essence, the game plays out as follows. Rock, paper and scissors are the choices. Rock beats scissors, scissors beats paper, and paper beats rock. The winning payoff is δ and the loosing payoff is −ε. In the event of ties, no one gets a reward. The agents choose a strategy (x, y, 1 − x − y) in the probability simplex. The smoothed best response dynamics are given by
exp(β(xδ−yε))+exp(β(−xε+δ(−x−y+1)))+exp(β(yδ−ε(−x−y+1))) − y Independent of the constant β, the equilibrium is the strategy (1/3, 1/3, 1/3) for both players; however, the choice of β results in very interesting dynamical systems behavior. In Figure 4 , we show the phase plots for different values of β-note that this behavior persists even for different choices of ε, δ. It can be seen that in the case where β = 10, (1/3, 1/3, 1/3) is a stable center while, in the case where β = 35, a stable limit cycle forms around (1/3, 1/3, 1/3). In [27] , the authors perform a bifurcation analysis and characterize more fully the limiting behavior as a function of the choice of β. 
A.5.2. GRADIENT BANDITS
To begin with, we can view the stochastic MAB problem as an instantiation of the MARL problem that was previously described, with one state and finite actions. Using policy gradient in this situation, with a particular class of parametric policies gives the gradient bandits algorithm. In gradient bandits, a player i ∈ I maintains a vector of weights x i ∈ R m i , with one weight for each action in U i where |U i | = m i , which is assumed to by finite. Denote these weights x i,1 , . . . , x i,m i . The policy is then assumed to be the soft-max over the weights-i.e. for each action ∈ U i ,
Proposition 20 Gradient bandits is a competitive gradient-based learning algorithm. In the full information case, under the assumptions of Theorem 10, gradient bandits converges to strict saddle points on a set of measure zero. In the gradient-free case, under the assumptions of Theorem 12 (respectively, Theorem 14), gradient bandits converges to strict saddles (respectively, linearly unstable cycles) on a set of measure zero.
Proof Just as in the policy gradient case, we simply need to derive the expression for the gradient.
Consider the full information case. For simplicity of notation, we will consider player i's weight to be x i = x-that is, we drop the index. The gradient bandit algorithm can be viewed as a single-
Simple calculus gives us that
On the other hand, in the partial information case, at each iteration t of the gradient update procedure, the player plays an action u t , receives a reward r t , and calculates the unbiased estimator for the gradient of a single weight x as
With the expressions for the gradient in both the full information and gradient-free cases, it is clear that gradient bandits is a competitive gradient-based learning algorithm. Thus, the results of Section 4 apply under the appropriate assumptions.
For two player matrix games, we can derive the game hessian Dω, described in Section 4.1. With this, we can check analytically the classification of critical points by examining the spectrum of Dω. Let y 1 , . . . , x m 1 be the weights of player 1, and y 1 , . . . , y m 2 be the weights of player 2. Further, let π = (π 1 , π 2 ).
We first find an expression for D 2 x j ,x f 1 by simply expanding the expression for D x f 1 (x, y). Indeed, substituting in for D x π i (x)(u i ), and then simplifying again, we get that:
Now evaluating the expression and simplifying, we get:
We now find an expression for D 2 z j x f 1 in an analogous way.
With these terms, we can completely construct the matrix Dω.
To further illustrate the complex behaviors that can arise out of multi-agent reinforcement learning and gradient-based algorithms in zero-sum games, we make two instances of gradient bandits, with β 1 = β 2 = 1 play a game of Rock-Paper-Scissors as defined in 17, with δ = = 1. Let x = (x 1 , x 2 , x 3 ) y = (y 1 , y 2 , y 3 ) be the weights for players 1 and 2.In this game, the Nash strategy, x 1 = x 2 , x 3 = c 1 and y 1 = y 2 = y 3 = c 2 for c 1 , c 2 ∈ R, equivalent to π 1 = π 2 = (1/3, 1/3, 1/3),can be shown to be a saddle point for the game dynamics by evaluating the expression for the hessian above. In fact, in Figure 5 , we can see how the weights of player 1 evolve in a fixed area centered at x 1 = x 2 = x 3 = 4, without ever converging to a cycle or an equilibrium. Figure 5 : Two gradient-bandits instances playing in the zero-sum rock-paper-scissors game defined in 17 with δ = = 1. Both players were randomly initialized, and x 3 = 4 and y 3 = 5 were fixed and not trained to simplify the visualization. For the players' policies, β 1 = β 2 = 1. The resulting game dynamics have both players evolving in a fixed area centered at the nash strategies x 1 = x 2 = x 3 = 4 and y 1 = y 2 = y 3 = 3 respectively.
A.5.3. EXP3
Another commonly used MAB algorithm, Exp3 (see, e.g., [1] for more detail), can also be seen as a gradient-based learning algorithm. A given player i using Exp3 maintains a policy over actions, where the policy class is parametrized by an exploration constant γ i , and a vector of weights x i ∈ R m i . We assume the exploration constant is fixed a priori and the agents are optimizing over the weights.
Proposition 21 Multi-agent Exp3 bandits is a competitive gradient-based learning algorithm. In the full information case, under the assumptions of Theorem 10, Exp3 bandits converges to strict saddle points on a set of measure zero. In the gradient-free case, under the assumptions of Theorem 12 (respectively, Theorem 14), Exp3 bandits converges to strict saddles (respectively, linearly unstable cycles) on a set of measure zero.
Proof We simply need to derive the gradient-based learning rule for each agent. Each weight x i, is assigned to an action in U i = {1, . . . , m i } where ∈ {1, . . . , m i }. The policy of the agent is calculated as
A player implementing Exp3 can be seen as minimizing the loss function
The full information gradient for Exp3 is given by
On the other hand, in the gradient-free case, in the Exp3 algorithm, at each iteration, the agent plays an action u t , receives a reward r t , and updates their weights using the algorithm
Note that (r t 1 ut= )/π i (x i )( ), is an unbiased estimator forR i, . Thus, the Exp3 update can be seen as a gradient-free update on the loss f i with step size γ i /m i .
Appendix B. Genericity of Non-Degenerate Differential Nash
In order to prove genericity of non-degenerate differential Nash, we need some mathematical prelimiaries.
B.1. Preliminaries
Consider smooth manifolds X and Y of dimension n x and n y respectively. An k-jet from X to Y is an equivalence class
k if x = y and in some (and hence any) pair of charts adapted to f at x, f and g have the same derivatives up to order k. We use the notation [x, f, U ] k = j k f (x) to denote the k-jet of f at x. The set of all k-jets from X to Y is denoted by J k (X, Y ). The jet bundle J k (X, Y ) is a smooth manifold (see [26, Chapter 2] for the construction). For each
and refer to it as the k-jet extension.
Definition 22
Let X, Y be smooth manifolds and f : X → Y be a smooth mapping. Let Z be a smooth submanifold of Y and p a point in X. Then f intersects Z transversally at
A subset of a topological space X is residual if it contains the intersection of countably many opendense sets. We say a property is generic if the set of all points of X which possess this property is residual [9] .
Theorem 23 (Jet Transversality Theorem, Chapter 2 of [26] ). Let X, Y be C ∞ manifolds without boundary, and let The Jet Transversality Theorem and Proposition 24 can be used to show a subset of a jet bundle having a particular set of desired properties is generic. Indeed, consider the jet bundle J k (X, Y ) and recall that it is a manifold that contains jets j k f : X → J k (X, Y ) as its elements where f ∈ C k (X, Y ). Let Z ⊂ J k (X, Y ) be the submanifold of the jet bundle that does not possess the desired properties. If dim X < codim Z, then for a generic function f ∈ C k (X, Y ) the image of the k-jet extension is disjoint from Z implying that there is an open-dense set of functions having the desired properties.
B.2. Proof of Theorem 9
We prove the theorem for more general smooth manifolds as player strategy spaces, although we are primarily concerned with Euclidean space in this paper. Proof Consider an n-player game where player i's cost function is sufficiently smooth real-valued map on X = X 1 × · · · × X n , i.e. f i ∈ C 2 (X, R), and where dim X i = m i and m = n i=1 m i . Let J 2 (X, R n ) denote the second order jet bundle containing 2-jets j 2 f such that f = (f 1 , . . . , f n ) : X → R n . Let (U, ϕ) be a product chart on X that contains (x 1 , . . . , x n ).
We define S(m) to be the symmetric m × m matrices as follows
For (A 1 , . . . , A n ) ∈ S(m) n , we can partition each A i as follows. First, consider
The non-degeneracy of a differential Nash equilibrium is determined by the determinant of Dω. Recall that Dω is constructed from components of the symmetric matrices D 2 f i , i.e. the Hessians of each f i . Hence, we partition the space S(m) 2 into two subsets S 1 (m) and S 2 (m) where S 1 (m) is constructed such that and S 2 (m) is the set of m × m matrices composed of the remaining block rows of each A i not included in B ∈ S 1 (m). Hence, S 1 (m) is the space corresponding to Dω and S 2 (m) is the space in which matrices constructed from the other pieces of the player Hessians that were excluded in the construction of Dω.
Then J 2 (X, R n ) is locally diffeomorphic to
n-times (20) and the 2-jet extension of f = (f 1 , . . . , f n ) at a point x = (x 1 , . . . , x n ) ∈ X, namely j 2 f (x), in coordinates is given by (ϕ(x), ((f i • ϕ −1 )(ϕ(x))) i∈I , (Df i (x)) i∈I , (D 2 f i (x)) i∈I ).
Define Z(m) = {A ∈ S 1 (m)| det(A) = 0}.
Z(m) is an algebraic set and hence, admits a canonical Whitney stratification having finitely many algebraic strata (see Chapter 1, Theorem 2.7 of [18] ), i.e. it is the finite union of submanifolds. By its construction, Z(m) has no interior points. Hence, it has co-dimension at least 1. Now, we consider the subset of the jet bundle J 2 (X, R n ) defined by
where 0 R m i is the zero vector in R m i . Note that {0 R m i } has co-dimension m i . Hence, G 1 is the union of submanifolds of co-dimension at least m + 1. By the Jet Transversality Theorem and Proposition 24, since m + 1 > m, for generic f = (f 1 , . . . , f n ), the image of the 2-jet extension j 2 f is disjoint from G 1 . Hence, there is an open-dense set of functions f = (f 1 , . . . , f n ) such that for each x ∈ X, whenever D i f i (x) = 0 for all i ∈ I (i.e. ω(x) = 0), the derivative of the differential game form has non-zero determinant (i.e. det Dω(x) = 0). Note that the conditions ω(x) = 0 and det(Dω(x)) = 0 are coordinate-invariant. Hence, this result is independent of the choice of chart. Similarly, consider another subset of J 2 (X, R n ) defined by ii f i (x)) = 0 for each i ∈ I and det(Dω(x)) = 0 independent of the choice of chart.
Thus, there exists an open-dense set G ⊂ C 2 (X, R n ) such that for all f = (f 1 , . . . , f n ) ∈ G, if x ∈ X is a local Nash equilibrium, then x is a non-degenerate differential Nash equilibrium. Indeed, suppose (f 1 , . . . , f n ) ∈ G and x ∈ X is a local Nash equilibrium. Then, by Proposition 1 of [43] , x necessarily satisfies ω(x) = 0 and D 2 ii f i (x) ≥ 0 for each i ∈ I. However, since (f 1 , . . . , f n ) ∈ G, det(D 2 ii f i (x)) = 0 so that D 2 ii f i (x) > 0. Hence, x is a differential Nash equilibrium. Further, (f 1 , . . . , f n ) ∈ G implies that det(Dω(x)) = 0; hence, x is non-degenerate.
Appendix C. Theorems Used in Proofs
Theorem 25 (Center and Stable Manifolds [46, Theorem III.7] , [47] ) Let x 0 be a fixed point for the C r local diffeomorphism f : U → R n where U ⊂ R n is an open neighborhood of x 0 in R n and r ≥ 1. Let E s ⊕ E c ⊕ E u be the invariant splitting of R n into generalized eigenspaces of Dφ(x 0 ) corresponding to eigenvalues of absolute value less than one, equal to one, and greater than one. To the Dφ(x 0 ) invariant subspace E s ⊕ E c there is an associated local φ-invariant C r embedded disc W cs loc called the local stable center manifold of dimension dim(E s ⊕ E c ) and ball B around x 0 such that φ(W cs loc ) ∩ B ⊂ W cs loc , and if φ n (x) ∈ B for all n ≥ 0, then x ∈ W sc loc .
Consider a general stochastic approximation framwork x t+1 = x t + γ t (h(x t )) + t for h : X → T X with h ∈ C 2 and where X ⊂ R d and where T X denotes the tangent space.
Theorem 26 (Theorem 1 [40] ) Suppose γ t is F t -measurable and E[ t |F t ] = 0. Let the stochastic process {x t } t≥0 be defined as above for some sequence of random variables { t } and {γ t }. Let p ∈ X with h(p) = 0 and let W be a neighborhood of p. Assume that there are constants η ∈ (1/2, 1] and c 1 , c 2 , c 3 , c 4 > 0 for which the following conditions are satisfied whenever x t ∈ W and t sufficiently large: (i) p is a linear unstable critical point, (ii) c 1 /t η ≤ γ t ≤ c 2 /t η , (iii) E[( t ·v) + |F t ] ≥ c 3 /t η for every unit vector v ∈ T X, and (iv) t 2 ≤ c 4 /t η . Then P (x t → p) = 0. 
Appendix D. Additional Information Related to Numerical Examples
We present the method of Lyapunov Iterations for solving coupled Ricatti equations, which in turn allows us to find the global Nash equilibria of a two-player LQR game. Further information for the proof of optimality and the following method can be found in [2] and [33] respectively.
We first make an assumption on the dynamics.
Assumption 4 Either
Without loss of generality, we assume (A, B 1 , Q 1/2 1 ) is stabilizable-detectable. We employ the following iterative Lyapunov algorithm for finding the Nash equilibrium to the linear quadratic game [33] : 
1 A + Q 1 (25) and compute the corresponding gain matrix for player 1. 
We note that initializing using this method ensures that the initial closed loop matrix A − B 1 K
1 − B 2 K
2 is stable. step 2 Given P 
2 ) (29)
step 3 Update the cost-to-go matrices by solving the Lyapunov equations:
Repeat steps 2-3 until the gains converge.
